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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Labor Law-Secondary Boycott-Inducement of Neutral Employees
and Threats Against Neutral Employer Held Unlawful
Under 1959 L.M.R.D.A.
Union had advised the secondary employer, a general con-
tractor, that the common work situs of a multi-employer project
would be picketed unless the non-union employees of the primary
employer, an independent subcontractor, were removed from the
job or, in the alternative, the subcontractor would sign a union
contract. Union had also instructed one of the secondary employer's
employees to discontinue working and he complied. Picketing, re-
sulting in a general work stoppage, was commenced, the union
advising the general contractor that picketing would stop only if
the conditions were met. The NLRB found that the union had
induced the secondary employee to cease work because of the
primary dispute and secondly, that the union's action had the effect
of coercing the secondary employer to cease doing business with
the primary employer. Held, Affirmed (modified on other grounds).
Although the inducement of individual secondary employees to cease
work and the coercion and restraint of secondary employers had
been lawful under the original boycott ban of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the court agreed that the 1959 amendments were clearly in-
tended to remedy this situation when such activities are used to
effect unlawful objectives proscribed by the Act. NLRB v. Hod
Carriers, Local 1140, 285 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1960).
Dual congressional objectives conflict in this area of the na-
tional labor policy-preserving the right of labor organizations to
bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor
disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and the public in
controversies not their own. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Con-
struction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). While the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1956), provided protections for the former, it was later to be
found that the interaction of the Wagner Act and the earlier Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1956), had,
by removing the power of the federal courts to grant injunctions
against labor organizations, see e.g., Drivers Union v. Lake Valley
Co., 311 U.S. 91, 100-101 (1940), denied protection to an un-
offending employer who was subjected to secondary boycotts. To
remedy this situation the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
(hereinafter called: the Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141
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(1956), sought to eliminate the secondary boycott as a legal pres-
sure-weapon available to labor. See, the remarks of Senator Taft
concerning Section 8(b) (4) of the Act to the effect that there are
no "good" secondary boycotts and that this section purported to
make all secondary boycotts an unfair labor practice, 93 CONG.
REc. 4198 (1947); cf.: a contrary view, Previant, Boycotts Under
the 1959 Amendments, N.Y.U. 13th ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 141,
143-144 (1960). Thus the means of protecting the neutral employer
from secondary activities was thought to have been accomplished.
However, the legislative purpose was only generally defined and
the language of the statute did not distinguish between lawful primary
conduct and the illegal secondary activity. Subsequently, the in-
terpretations of the courts frustrated the ideal of a complete boy-
cott ban, by constructing loopholes to permit some types of sec-
ondary activity. Congress, in its passage of the Labor Management
Reporting & Disclosure Act (hereinafter called: the 1959 Act),
73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1960 Cum. Supp.), sought
to eliminate the ineffectiveness of the Act by redrafting Section
8(b) (4) to eliminate the former exceptions and to impose addi-
tional sanctions against labor in the area. The principal case is
noteworthy in that it represents the courts' initial impression of the
new boycott provisions. The Hod Carrier's decision, supra, further
represents a direct rule upon two questions in the former "loop-
hole" area.
Concerning the particular questions of the principal case, Sec-
tion 8(b) (4) of the Act declared that it was an unfair labor
practice for a union or its agent:
"To engage in, or induce or encourage the employees of
any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment . . . to perform any services,
where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer ... to ceaseo g
business with any other person;
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees unless such labor organization has been certified
as the representative of such employees under the provisions
of Section 9;"
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Several Board and court-created exceptions, two of which are
herein discussed, were engrafted onto this particular section of
the Act. In 1951, the Supreme Court held that the concept of
"concerted refusal" did not include the inducement or encourage-
ment of individual employees of a neutral employer from engaging
in unlawful objectives proscribed by the Act. NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Company, 341 U.S. 665 (1951). By substituting the
word "individual" for the term "employees," and by deleting the
term "concerted," the authors of the 1959 Act purported to abrogate
the effect of the Rice Milling decision, supra. See Section 8 (b) (4) (i),
1959 Act. The court in the Hod Carrier's decision, supra, has
now effectively affirmed the congressional intent on this question.
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257, 271 (1959-60), and overrules
Rice Milling to the extent that that decision holds individual em-
ployees were not within the ambit of the boycott ban.
The second loophole was one of much greater significance than
the inducement of individual employees mentioned above. This
latter exception also arose by judicial interpretation. Although the
Act prohibited unions from inducing or encouraging employees of
a neutral employer from engaging in a proscribed object, Section
8(b) (4) was construed to permit unions to resort to almost any
means in seeking to persuade neutral employers to refrain from
doing business with another firm. See Local 1976, Carpenters &
Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958); Local 47, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 112 N.L.R.B. 923 (1955). So it is of
particular interest to employers that the new prohibition against a
union's threatening, coercing or restraining "any person engaged
in commerce or an industry affecting commerce." Section 8(b) (4)
(ii), 1959 Act, was drafted to wholly eliminate actions against
the employer directly as a means of effecting a secondary boycott.
The court in the principal case encountered no difficulty in finding
a violation of this section in that the threats against the employer
were uncontroverted, stating further that "comments and statements
of the Union agents speak for themselves."
Although the determination of an unfair labor practice throuh
the threats directed to the employer was easily determined in the
instant case, this area will probably be a troublesome one in the
future. Cf., the remarks of Senator Humphrey, 105 CONG. REc.
6231 (1959). Appealing to the reason of the neutral employer will
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probably be considered permissible, Local 1976, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958), but when such appeal
is coupled with even an insinuation of pressure, as in the principal
case, the Board will find an unfair labor practice. It is suggested
that this section is not only plainly designed to protect neutral em-
ployers against threats of strikes and refusals to work by their
employees, but also against threats of other kinds including those
of bodily assaults. If the Board construes "coerce, or restrain"
in Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) of the 1959 Act as it has "restrain or
coerce" in Section 8(b) (1) of the Act the prohibitions will be
broad. This construction should afford protection not only against
plainly coercive tactics, such as physical injury, cf., NLRB v.
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 55, 205 F.2d
515 (10th Cir. 1953), striking and picketing, cf., Alpert v. Excavat-
ing Material Union, 184 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1960) (where
threat of strike was used), but also against more subtle forms of
coercion, such as derogatory statements about the secondary em-
ployer or his business or labor policies, so long as the object thereof
is to force or require him to discontinue dealings with a primary
employer. Cf., NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
However, the 1959 Act specifically permits truthful union publicity,
such as passing out handbills, radio and newspaper advertisements
concerning a secondary employer's dealings with one whom the
union has a primary strike. See the "Publicity" proviso appended
to Section 8(b) (4), 1959 Act. This publicity alone apparently
should not be construed to be evidence of an inducement, coercion
or restraint of an employer, even though it may indirectly affect
him. Williams, Freedom to Speak-But Only Ineffectively, 38 TEx.
L. REv. 373, 386 (1960).
Another problem in the principal case conjoins with the ap-
plication of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii)B; this decision also
involves "situs" difficulties between the unionized major contractor
and non-union subcontractor. In this area the courts have de-
veloped certain evidentiary standards to determine whether the
facts involve secondary, and thus unlawful, activities or whether
they involve primary and lawful disputes. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a strike and picketing at a construction project
to force a general contractor to stop doing business with a sub-
contractor is an unlawful use of economic pressure. NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, supra. This determination
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called for complex rules in the area of "common situs" disputes
in order to differentiate the character of the activities. But in a
given situs dispute the general rule of the Denver case is qualified
by the Moore Dry Dock standards. Matter of Sailor's Union of
the Pacific and Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
This rule is to the effect that picketing the premises of a secondary
employer remains primary if it meets the following conditions:
(a) the picketing must clearly indicate the union's dispute is not with
the person on whose premises it is taking place; (b) it must be limited
to times when the struck employer is working on the neutral's
premises; (c) it must be limited to places reasonably close to the
struck employer's activities; (d) the struck employer must be en-
gaged in his normal business on the struck premises. This decision
was approved by a number of circuit courts. Piezonki v. NLRB,
219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Local Union No. 55, 218
F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954); but cf., Note, Common Situs Rules Fade
Away as NLRB and Courts Look to Object of Union's Picketing in
Taft-Hartley Section 8(b) (4) (A) Cases, 45 GEo. L. J. 614 (1957).
The Moore Dry Dock tests are, as mentioned, evidentiary and will
not be resorted to where evidence of unlawful secondary activities
are clear, as in the Hod Carrier's case, supra.
There are other interpretations in this area of "situs" disputes.
Where the primary employer farms out struck work to a secondary
employer, the latter by performing this work, is held to have lost
his status as a neutral, and hence his immunity from the lawful pri-
mary pressures of the union. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of
Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). It was suggested
that a related situation occurs where an employer transfers a portion
of his operations for performance by some other employer and
refuses to bargain with the union concerning the transfer despite
the fact that it means layoff for some of the employees represented
by the union. This employer should also lose his status as a neutral.
See, REP. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1954).
By the language of the 1959 Act, see the second proviso to
Section 8(b) (4) which states:
"Provided, that nothing contained in this subsection (b)
shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person
to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his
own employer) if the employees of such employer are engaged
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in a strike ratified or approved by the representative of such
employees whom such employer is required to recognize under
this Act;"
and by the congressional policy behind it, see H. R. REP. No. 1147,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1959), the revision of the boycott ban
provision did not purport to upset these established rules-Moore
Dry Dock, the Ally Doctrine, and the Transfer of Work Doctrine,
among others. Such rules are necessary developments in determ-
ing whether pressure activities engaged in by unions and employees
are lawful and protected under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, or
are unlawful as coming within Section 8(b) (4) prohibitions as
secondary activities.
As the principal case mainly dealt with "loopholes" of the
technical variety, it does not foreshadow any sweeping changes in
the doctrines just discussed. These latter doctrines may be con-
sidered to be loopholes by some, depending upon one's viewpoint;
however, they have been found useful in determining the ticklish
situs problems in the construction industry. For this reason, and
until a better legislative solution is offered, it is suggested that the
courts will not interpret the new boycott bans to sweep away these
major evidentiary rules in order to declare all union activity in-
volving multi-employer disputes secondary, ergo unfair labor prac-
tices.
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Minerals-Natural Gas-Title Not Lost by Storage Underground
P, as owner of a partial interest in the proceeds from the sale
of gas produced by certain wells, sought an accounting and to
restrain the artificial cutting-back and restriction of production.
Ds alleged that the native reserve of gas in the drainage areas of
the wells had previously been exhausted and that the gas now
being produced is storage gas which has migrated from an adjoining
underground storage pool. Ds contend that production of this gas
for P's benefit would amount to a wrongfil taking of property be-
longing to the storage companies. Held, judgment for D. Title to
natural gas, once having been reduced to possession, is not lost,
under Pennsylvania law, by injection of such gas into natural under-
ground reservoir for storage purposes. White v. New York State
Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Pa. 1960).
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